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TRUTH TELLING IN EASTERN EUROPE: 
THE LIBERATION AND THE BURDEN 
by Walter Sawatsky 
Dr. Walter Sawatsky (Mennonite) is a professor at the Associated Mennonite 
Biblical Seminaries, Elkhart, Indiana. He is a former director of the European 
Office of the Mennonite Central Committee and travelled widely in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. He is the author of Evangelicals in the Soviet Union 
and a member of the advisory editorial board and regular contributor to OPREE. 
This was article was originally delivered as the Peace Lecture Series, Bethel 
College, November I 5, 1990. 
THE REVOLUTION OF THE WORD 
In Christian thought there is a close connection between word, truth, life, and freedom. 
John's Gospel begins with the claim that "in the beginning was the Word" and then 
identifies Jesus Christ as the Word, as God. Later in the gospel there is the self-disclosure 
by Jesus that "I am the way, the truth, and the life." At still another point Jesus declares 
that "you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free." This is all quite familiar 
to the Christian. A Christian may well remember that God's initial self -disclosure in 
Genesis is as a creator who creates by speaking, "And God said. . . and there was . . . . " 
Why then, should it be so surprising for many Christians, that the revolution which 
transformed the so-called Second World, especially in 1989, should be called a revolution 
of the word? Was that not to be expected? Was not the word more powerful than the 
sword? Was not the truth stronger than the lie? Perhaps we did not really believe such 
idealist statements--we were for 'realism'--and so we did not know whether the people of 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could ever discover a powerful word of truth. 
There are many descriptions for the revolutions of '89. In Czechoslovakia they were 
soon calling it the Velvet Revolution, or the Laughing Revolution--it was so gentle. For 
Poland the word Solidarity may well say it all. One scholar entitled his recent book 
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Lighting the Night, 1 having in mind the illuminating power of truth finally being spoken 
and heard. Most of us have already become so accustomed to the politics of glasnost, that 
we forget the essence of its attractiveness--glasnost meant to speak openly, to have words 
mean what they say, and that was very new in the context of Soviet and East European 
"Newspeak" or "Doublespeak". 
As was to be expected, most journalists and commentators tried to fall back on the 
standard explanatory repertoire to account for the "Collapse of Communism,"2 as they put 
it. The economic f�ctor was primary. A command economy had reached the limits of its 
growth, could not keep pace with the flexible responses of the Western capitalist market 
economy to new technology, to the computer revolution. Another factor was. the 
communications revolution that made it much easier for the Western world to inform 
Eastern Europe about its consumer life style and about the oppressions of their own 
regimes. Many commentators subscribed to the Great Person theory, as a result of which 
the explanation always hinged on the Gorbachev phenomenon, and the future depended on 
his staying in office. 
There is no need to denigrate these explanations--they have their relevance. Related 
to them however, is a body of assumptions about the exercise of power through nuclear 
deterrence, about beggaring the Soviet Union into submission through the spiralling arms 
race, about the winning of the Cold War by the West, that do not account for the changes 
we are witnessing. To tell the story from the perspective of the participants, including 
even official voices up to the level of a Gorbachev, requires talking in the first place about 
a moral revolution, precipitated by telling the truth, by a deep longing everywhere to' start 
living in truth. 
Let us recall the main events, at least for 1 989, before we analyze the moral revolution 
common to all. Where to start already begs the question of motivation, of explanation. 
The Soviet Union considers perestroika and glasnost to have been launched in Aprill 985, 
but the moments when the transformation became an irreversible popular phenomenon 
were later. Having permitted multiple candidates for the national election of March 26, 
1989, the press immediately published in detail the results which showed many instances 
where the old Party candidates were not elected, and where persons advocating change, 
including even four members of the clergy, were elected. When the congress met in 
Moscow in June, it became a national school for democracy. The entire proceedings 'were 
1William Erikson. Lighting the Night: Revolution in Eastern Europe. (New York: William 
Morrow & Company, Inc. 1 990). 
2See for example Bernard Gwertzman and Michael T. Kaufman. eds. The Collapse of 
Communism. (New York: Time Books, 1990), selected articles from the New York Times. 
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shown on national television, with reruns at other times of the day and talk shows 
analyzing what was happening. When the procurator general was to be reelected, he sa� 
somewhat sheepishly in the front, hearing himself accused of coresponsibility for 
miscarriage of justice, squeaking by on the actual vote, thanks to the still heavy dominance 
of the apparat. By June of 1 990, the parliamentarians had become more adept and explicit 
when speaking about systemic faults, but now the Russian and Ukrainian assemblies, or 
the Moscow and Leningrad city government were the new forums for legislating more 
radical chan�e. 
In early 1 989 the Round Table talks between "former prisoners and their former 
gaolers" had begun.3 Solidarnosc, still deemed officially dead as late as July 1 988, was the 
negotiating partner. The resultant document of April 5 talked about "the beginning of the 
road to parliamentary democracy," announcing semi-controlled elections for June 1 989. 
Solidarity was eligible to campaign for a third of the seats, and voters could unelect 
candidates by crossing out their names. "Solidarity" now counted on a democratic election 
four years hence. To their own astonishment they won, the Party lost, and the Party 
publicly acknowledged the defeat. Then came more negotiations, but Solidarity's popular 
support grew,4 the economy remaining in severe crisis. On August 1 9  General Jaruszelski 
invited Solidarity's candidate for Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, to form a coalition 
government. Those former prisoners of scarcely a year earlier now sat in cabinet. 
If in Poland it was an election, so remarked Timothy Garton Ash, "in Hungary it was a 
funeral: the funeral of Imre Nagy, just thirty-one years after his death."5 Political changes 
in Hungary had been proceeding more gradually. Janos Kadar had been replaced in 
autumn of 1 988, but the new leaders came to realize that the ghost of the past, those 
repressions after the unsuccessful uprising of 1 956, must be confronted. Hence the funeral 
of Nagy, the prime minister who had been executed on Soviet command. The speeches at 
the funeral provided the occasion for speaking the truth about the past. It became "not the 
funeral of Imre Nagy" but his resurrection and "the funeral of Janos Kadar"6 who in fact 
died three weeks later on the day when the Hungarian Supreme Court announced Nagy's 
full legal rehabilitation. In May 1 989 came the cutting of the barbed wire border between 
3Timothy Garton Ash. The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw. 
Budapest. Berlin and Prague. (New York: Random House, 1 990), p. 1 7. 
· 
4 Ash remarked "there is nothing, but nothing, to match the legitimacy that comes from the 
barrel of the ballot-box." Ibid.,  p. 3 1 .  
5Ibid., p. 47. 
6Ibid., p. 53. 
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Hungary and Austria. That was the catalyst for the revolution to begin in East Germany, 
ruining the carefully staged fortieth anniversary celebrations of the Honecker government. 
East Germans began to escape to the West through the opened Hungarian border. By 
mid-summer thousands of would-be emigrants were overflowing the West German 
embassy in Prague as well, and finally a train of emigrants was sent, back through Leipzig, 
to West Germany. When Gorbachev visited in early October he made clear his leanings 
when he warned the rigid leadership that history would judge those who came late. The 
'peace prayers' and. street demonstrations grew exponentially from 30,000 to 70,000 to 
300,000 to 500,000. · "The whole of East Germany suddenly went into labor, an old world­
-to recall Marx's image--pregnant with the new. From that time forward the people acted 
and the Party reacted . . .  'We are the people!' they chanted, and the party leadership 
opened the Wall."7 Elections were held in March 1 990, and a coalition headed by the 
Christian Democratic Union resulted. The new cabinet included four Protestant clergy. 
One of them, the new Minister of Defense Rainer Epplemann, had been imprisoned as 
pacifist only a few years earlier. 
Although there was ferment long before, and students had taken action in early 1 989,8 
it was on November 1 7, 1 989, that the Czech revolution began in earnest. Students had 
organized a memorial demonstration on Wenceslas Square in Prague to mark the fiftieth 
anniversary of the murder of Jan Opletal by the Nazis. The police reacted with violence, 
beating men, women, and children with their truncheons. The students who escaped, 
appeared at the Synod of the Church of the Evangelical Czech Brethren to report, and the 
rather diplomatically worded statement to government just approved by the Synod was 
quickly rewritten to articulate a strong protest against such police actions. The Catholic 
Church also responded in kind and the messages were spread throughout the churches on 
Sunday. By November 20, day three of the rapidly moving events, Civic Forum had 
become the voice of the opposition. Headed by the playwright and co-founder of Charta 
77, Vaclav Havel, the motley assortment of activists met in the basement of the Magic 
Lantern theatre. Timothy Garton Ash, who was present and had supplied the memorable 
quip about ten years for change in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten weeks in the GDR, 
therefore 1 0  days in Czechoslovakia, described what he met in that Magic Lantern: 
Twenty years ago they were journalists, academics, politicians, lawyers, but now 
they come here from their jobs as stokers, window-cleaners, clerks or, at best, 
banned writers. Sometimes they have to leave a meeting to go and stoke up their 
7Ibid., p. 69. 
8Commemorating the death of Jan Potocka. The authorities launched interrogations, but at the 
Comenius Faculty students and faculty had established solidarity with each other and mediated 
talks with the authorities were proceeding. 
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boilers. A few of them come straight from prison, whence they have been released 
under the pressure of popular protest. 9 
The authorities began to negotiate. Jakes, Husak, and other badly compromised leaders 
resigned, and the people continued to gather in the hundreds of thousands on Wenceslas 
Square. Two men from the police wanted to speak to the crowd, who were in no mood to 
be friendly to representatives of the oppressors. But Civic Forum leader Vaclav Maly, a 
banned priest, called on the crowd to let them speak, saying that one could not condemn 
before letting them be heard. Both speakers described how badly they felt for having done 
violence to the people and apologized. Padre Maly then announced to the masses that he 
was a priest, and in his tradition there was a place for forgiveness. He invited all who 
wished to join him in speaking the Lord's Prayer. Soon the entire mass of people was 
praying, some recalling the phrases from a dim memory, others lipreading from neighbors. 
It was one of many special, unforgettable moments for those who were present.10 Other 
moments were to see Dubcek, followed by Havel, address them from the Castle b·alcony. 
Then at the end of December 1 989, the Communist authorities had agreed to accept 
Dubcek as Chairman of the Federal Assembly and Havel as President of the Republic-­
"the Party had to swallow both, the man of '68 and the man of '89."11 
Still shorter, but unfortunately more violent, was the Romanian revolution that brought 
the downfall of "socialism in one family", the Ceaucescu family. The November 20 Party 
congress had still provided television imagery of full, unanimous support for Nicolae 
Ceaucescu. But on December 1 6  the soldiers massacred a crowd of supporters of the 
beleaguered Hungarian Reformed pastor Laszlo Tokes. The Romanian people found the 
courage to suffer, and by Christmas eve Ceaucescu and his wife had been arrested, 
summarily tried and executed. The truth about the regime, about its treatment of the 
people, especially of the handicapped, began to come out. The cup of suffering of the 
people was certainly full, but the new leaders seemed unprepared to move in a new 
direction. 
TELLING OR LIVING THE TRUTH HAD BECOME INCONCEIVABLE 
The Bolshevik revolutionaries of 1 9 1 7  had assumed that revolution comes about by 
force and that there would be widespread resistance, especially by those classes in society 
9Ibid., p. 86. 
10As recounted to the author by a participant from the Comenius Protestant Faculty. 
11Garton Ash, Magic Lantern, p. 1 25. 
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who needed to surrender power. For the revolution to succeed, force, including terror, 
soon also a secret police force became necessary. To sustain the totalist project required 
control of all the mechanisms for propaganda, information exchange and education. When 
Hannah Arendt wrote her classic on the Origins of Totalitarianism, she had in mind the 
highly developed state socialism of Stalinism, as well as Nazism. In recent years the debate 
. has revolved around the question whether the problem was Stalinism, the cult of 
personality, as Khrushchev chose to restrict the statement of the problem in 1 956, or 
whether anti-libert�rianism was inherent in the system. The totalitarian model has fallen 
into disrepute by Western scholars, because it provided inadequate explanatory power for 
the continuing changes and anomalies within and between countries.12 Nevertheless, the 
totalist intent, the common strain in all varieties of Marxism18 (and perhaps also in 
Christianity) are the point of reference for East European thinkers who have revived the 
concept of totalitarianism in order to envision a post-totalitarian mind or a post­
totalitarian state.14 
Their memory is of a society so ideological that truth and liberty became casualties. In 
order to sustain the rightness of party policy--and the Marxist view was that the Party was 
following the immutable dictates of historical determinism--it became increasingly 
necessary to declare as real what was patently untrue. Vaclav Havel, in his now famous 
essay of 1 978, "The Power of the Powerless," gave a vivid description and analysis of the 
greengrocer who placed in his shop window the sign "workers of the world unite." The 
sign did not help to sell vegetables the way a sign about the sale of carrots might, yet it did 
help the sale of carrots indirectly for this was the greengrocer's way of signaling his 
conformity with the system and avoiding unpleasantness. The statist system needed the 
ritual phraseology of workers of the world uniting, even though the actual prospect of such 
an eventuality would be destabilizing, because to abandon the ideological rituals would 
require an interlocking network of explanations of reality. It was easier to act as if the 
apparent was the real. As Havel put it, "because the regime is captive to its own lies, it 
must falsify everything. It falsifies the past, it falsifies the present, and it falsifies the 
12For example, Stephen Cohen. Rethinking the Soviet Experience. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1 985) Chap. 1 ;  cf. Pavel Campeanu. Exit: Toward Post-Stalinism. Vol,3 (Armonk 
NY: M.E.  Sharpe Inc, 1990). 
18So Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to 
Habermas. (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1 984). 
14Because they use it, I am therefore utilizing the word 'totalitarian.' It may be that the term 
has emerged more widely in Eastern Europe recently due to the lag in encountering Western 
literature. It now serves as useful bete noir against which to articulate what comes after, and the 
need to add national and historic differentiation will come later. 
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future. It falsifies statistics . . . It pretends to respect human rights. It pretends to 
persecute no one."15 An individual, such as the greengrocer in Prague, did not need to 
believe these mystifications "but they must behave as though they did, or they must at least 
tolerate them in silence . . .  they must live within a lie . . .  by this very fact, individuals 
confirm the system, fulfil the system, make the system, are the system."16 
In his Nobel speech six years earlier, Alexander Solzhenitsyn had drawn attention to · 
the connection between force and violence and truth: "nothing screens violence except lies, 
and the only way that lies can hold out is by violence. Whoever has once announced 
violence as his METHOD must inexorably choose lying as his PRINCIPLE."17 His simple 
answer to counter violence was for the individual "not to take part, not to support lies . . .  
once lies have been dispelled, the repulsive nakedness of violence will be exposed--and 
hollow violence will collapse.1118 At the time, Solzhenitsyn could attest to this from his 
experience with his jailers in the Gulag. Havel, with a more developed logic, argued that 
"if the main pillar of the system is living the lie, then it is not surprising that the 
fundamental threat to it is living the truth."19 Such observations can be applied universally 
where violence is to be confronted. 
For the East European situation, there was a further understanding because of the way 
the entire society had to live within a twisted 'as if' ideology. Since Stalinism there had 
developed the habit of claiming growth in stages toward full communism, real socialism 
being the current term. 'Real socialism' was what the authorities chose to call the post 
1 968 Czech society, rejecting 'socialism with a human face' as 'naive political 
romanticism'.2° Charta 77 signatory Miroslav Kusy quoted the excessive language of Vasil 
Bilak, a Czech communist who had read a paper in Sofia in 1 978, in which he claimed that 
the goals had been achieved, that the party and the people "have built a just, democratic, 
progressive, highly human social order." Miroslav Kusy responded that this showed that 
'real socialism' had now adopted the ideology of 'as if:' those who preach it behave as if 
15Vaclav Havel, et al, The Power of the Powerless. Citizens Against the State in Central­
Eastern Europe. Ed. John Keane (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1 985), p. 3 1 .  The essay was 
first published in 1 978. Also reprinted in William M. Brinton & Alan Rinzler,eds.Without Force 
or Lies. Voices From the Revolution of Central Europe in 1 989-90. Essays. Speeches. and 
Eyewitness Accounts. (San Francisco: Mercury House Inc., 1 990). 
16Ibid., p. 3 1 .  
17 Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Nobel Lecture. (New York: Farrer, Straus & Giroux, 1 972), p. 33. 
18Ibid. 
19Havel, 2l2.£it., p. 40. 
20Miroslav Kusy, "Chartism and 'real socialism'" in Havel, Power of..., p. 1 53. 
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the ideological kingdom of real socialism existed in 'what we have here and now'. . . the 
nation behaves as if it believed it, as if it were convinced that it lived in accordance with 
the ideologically real socialism.21 
For this "game of as if" to be maintained, both party and people had to keep up the 
pretence. That was demoralizing to both partners. That was what Havel meant when in 
his New Year's message of 1 990 he described the entire society as "morally ill because we 
are used to saying one thing and thinking another. We have learned not to believe in 
anything, not to care about each other, to worry only about ourselves."22 
Social scientist Jeffrey Goldfarb in his analysis of the post-totalitarian mind as 
embodied by Vaclav Havel, or by Adam Michnik of Poland, identified the essence of 
totalitarian culture as follows: violence defines truth. Today that truth, which is believed 
by no one, permeates the social structure, contaminates language, and becomes the 
destructive force of modern tyranny.28 The well known word for this violent definition of 
truth is Newspeak, so used by Orwell. And the problem with a society living under 
Newspeak is that "it makes the expression of other types of thought difficult if not 
impossible."24 To be against its policies does not achieve anything significant, that is 
merely to say 'Big Brother is ungood' (following Orwell's analogy). The Polish poet 
Stanislaw Baranczak illustrated the problem but also demonstrated how good literature can 
be written not only in spite of but even because of censorship: 
These Words 
These words from reviewing stands and those in parlors, 
these, sewn by the thick thread of a voice 
into the official-blue bag of a suit, and 
those, stripped naked of their denim 
in the probing search of revision; 
these, known from having been heard too often, and those, 
scarcely remembered from having been seen 
so rarely; these words, which easily 
let themselves slip through the strainer of a microphone, 
and those, which must work themselves through a grating 
with immense effort; these, 
delivered with unflinching audacity, and those, 
whispered softly from shame and anxiety into the ears 
of a guard; these, spoken straightforward 
into the dry eye of a camera, and those, which at being spoken 
one's eyes lower, for it is hard to bear a woman's tears; 
21.I.b.kl .• p. 1 64. 
22Brinton and Rinzler. Without Force or Lies, p. 277. 
28Jeffrey C. Goldfarb. Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind. (Chicago:University of 
Chicago Press, 1 989), p. 29. 
24J.liliL., p. 48. 
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these words, which are broken in conference rooms 
by stormy, long, unceasing applause, 
and those, in visiting rooms broken 
by the intervention of a watchful clock; these words, 
these words of speeches too long and conversations too short 
are--I know it's inconceivable--words 
of one and the same tongue. 25 
THE MORAL BREAKDOWN FROM LIVING THE LIE 
By the late 1 980s, the moral toll of living the big lie as a Soviet and East European 
society became too great. The initial intent of glasnost was to permit more truthful 
statistics in order to make planning more realistic and efficient. But where was the 
glasnost or truth telling to stop? It seemed that when responsible people looked about 
them, they were staggered by the negative results of a totalist project that had succumbed 
to systemic falsity. How could Soviet society be considered modern and progressive if its 
deficit in birth control devices was so great that the average Soviet woman would have 
three or more abortions? Statistics about a soaring divorce rate, about the drug problem, 
and especially about alcohol abuse were shocking. They showed how widespread was the 
social passivity, the loss of hope and meaning for the people. Now it has become a 
desperate need to show the extent of the moral breakdown. 
For example, the congress of the Communist Party in July 1 990 was overshadowed by 
the public showing of a two hour documentary film entitled "That's No Way to Live" (Tak 
Zhit ' Nel'zia). The film opens with footage about young criminals, murderers, who show 
no remorse, who enjoy reenacting the crime. At another point the camera pans the 
pedestrians in a small city in Central Russia, noting the shapeless clothing, the ragged 
boots, the poverty. As contrast the viewer is struck by the pure visages and orderly 
behavior of the crowds thronging Zagorsk monastery for the feast of the Holy Trinity. 
The commentator asks how is it that all that anti-religious propaganda has had the opposite 
effect? And that is good, he goes on. "These people live in hope, and have an ultimate 
hope. The country is seeking after God and it is good."26 But once again the scene shifts 
to the Ural region, to the wretched, abandoned churches. Ninety per cent of the cathedrals 
have been destroyed, we are told, but for what purpose? This church, the narrator 
explains, is unused, except for drinking and drug parties. The camera shows the graffiti 
on the wall--"Honda, Toyota, SPID [Aids], a condom,"--the narrator remarking with bitter 
25Quoted in Ibid., pp. 99- 1 00. 
26Translation mine. 
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irony--"our spiritual heritage." Sad spiritual music (an Orthodox requiem) cuts in as the 
eye of the camera rises to see what remains of Christ and the apostles on the ravaged 
frescoed walls. The narrator then proceeded to attack the party, focusing on one of 
those ubiquitous banners that proclaimed "the Party is the organizer of all our victories." 
Given the moral bankruptcy of society, the narrator suggests that perhaps we need a new 
Nurnberg trial. In any case, as far as the people are concerned "a moral judgement on the 
party is already in process." That leads finally to footage of the mass funerals in Baku 
after the army had s!tot at the demonstrators, and then on to the top of the Berlin Wall as it 
was being breached--"from this we need to learn a lesson" the narrator concludes. It was 
reported that Gorbachev had approved its screening, saying it was authentic. 
LIGHTS IN THE NIGHT 
The changes did not start with glasnost, and certainly not with the courageous people 
of 1 989. Before them came individual people who chose to live in truth, or to stop living 
the lie. The memories of those purged in the thirties and later have not been forgotten-­
their stories are being exhumed, and their names morally rehabilitated. There were also 
the voices of dissenters, who wrote without the eye of the censor, circulating their writings 
in samizdat form, who lost their fear of prison.27 There were indeed many ways in which 
the night had been illumined, and even now the dead still speak, as one dissident stated so 
eloquently some years ago: 
The dead speak. Without periods. 
And without commas. Almost without words. 
From concentration camps. From isolation cells. 
From houses savagely burning; 
The dead speak. Notebooks. 
Letters. Testaments. Diaries. 
Signature of a hasty hand 
on the rough surface of bricks. 
With a piece of iron on the frozen cot, 
On the wall with a fragment of broken glass, 
Life, while it lasted, left its signature 
On the prison floor in a trickle of blood. 
by Lev Ozarev.28 
27For a survey see, Ludmilla Alexeyeva. Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for 
National. Religious and Human Rights. (Wesleyan Press, 1 985). 
28Quoted in Stephen Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience, p. 1 10. 
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MAJOR MOMENTS IN THE SEA CHANGE 
There are several events in recent history that help to account for the ordinary person 
being swept up in the recent revolutions of the word. The first was probably the Papal 
visit to Poland of June 1 979. Billed by both sides as a purely religious visit, a "Pilgrimage 
of the Holy Spirit," it nevertheless had unmistakable political implications. The one 
thousand foreign journalists found it necessary to listen to and recognize the political 
power of the pope's moral rhetoric and the people's response. There was the significance 
of erecting a high cross on victory square, and the millions participating in open air mass . 
. There was the public chanting: "We want God in the family . . .  We want God in parents' 
concerns . . .  We want God in books, in schools, at work and in leisure time . . .  We want 
God in government orders, in books of law . . . .  "29 Polish specialist Alexander Tomsky 
went on: "By concentrating on the spiritual liberation of men, irrespective of political 
constraints, he transcended the inhibitions of political realism." In Krakow the Pope 
stated: "The future of Poland will depend on how many people are mature enough to be 
nonconformists. "30 
Those who were not at the actual events, could watch them live on Polish television, 
although the authorities began cutting back on coverage toward the end of the visit. Polish 
citizens found themselves responding to the church. As one party member put it, when he 
watched the installation of the Polish pope, "I suddenly found that I, my wife and daughter 
were on our knees. I, a member of the Communist Party, who had not been inside a 
church for perhaps . 1 5  years, was now crossing myself. It was a victory for this man, a 
victory for our Cardinal and the Church. It was also my own victory."31 
The former second-class citizens now lost their fear, and also regained a sense of 
peoplehood. Polish workers had united in strikes against government policy in 1 970 and 
1 976 but with limited success. In 1 980 they now formed an independent union named 
Solidarity that finally gained official recognition following another strike in the Gdansk 
shipyards. Here Lech Walesa, who had first come to prominence in 1 976, became the 
charismatic leader. Preceding those events was the formation of a Workers' Defence 
Committee (KOR) by a group of intellectuals, the best known of which were Jacek Kuron 
and Adam Michnik. They provided the ideas, the vision, and debated with the church the 
29 Alexander Tomsky ,"John Paul II in Poland: Pilgrim of the Holy Spirit," Religion in 
Communist Lands, Vol 7, No.3 (Autumn 1 979), p. 1 63. 
30Ibid., p. 1 65. 
31From the samizdat journal Spotkania. as quoted in Alexander Tomsky, "Poland's Church on 
the Road to Gdansk," Religion in Communist Lands, Vol.9, No. 1 -2 (Spring 1 98 1 ), p. 38. 
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ethics of solidarity. Father Jozef Tischner of Krakow became a respected ethicist for 
Solidarity.32 
It was all over on December 1 3, 198 1 ,  as far as many Western observers were 
concerned, when General Wojciech Jaruszelski declared martial law and the security forces 
quickly rounded up and imprisoned the main Solidarity leaders. But the memory of 
Solidarity's record lived on, one more episode in showing what a liberated Poland could be. 
The then president of the Polish Ecumenical Council, Dr. Witold Benedyktowicz, listed 
four major achieve!Dents of Solidarity.33 A sense of morality had returned to the work 
force, many voluntarily staying away from alcohol. There had been a new emphasis on 
elected persons to office who had personal merit, removing many incompetents. At least 
initially, Solidarity had lead the way in showing consideration to the non-Catholics. And 
finally, the country had achieved a sense of national purpose that the subsequent military 
regime could not harness to its own purposes so easily. As a movement, Solidarity went 
underground, with many of its key spokespersons showing personal integrity during their 
time in prison. 
Both the personality and the perceptions of Mikhail Gorbachev constitute a key 
element to account for the change in thinking. He was a child of the 1 956 Party 
congress,34 one who had been shaped by Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin. In 
addition, he was a person untainted by the excesses of Stalinism, he could act as a person 
of integrity. Gorbachev's main instrument turned out to be moral rhetoric. Calling for · 
more glasnost, he started to demonstrate what he meant. In his letter to America of 
November 1 987 he talked about losing one position after another in the global economic 
race, about "glaring shortcomings in our health services", and he kept emphasizing that 
"unless we activate the human factor it will be impossible for us to change the situation in 
the country." The media were beginning to uncover and handle new topics "and 
32Some of the debate on ethics between Catholics and humanists such as Michnik can be 
followed in ;"Dialogue between the Church and the 'Left" in Poland," Religion in Communist 
Lands, Vol.7, No. I (Spring 1 979), pp. 42-46; "Poland: the Meaning of 'Dialogue' between the 
Church and the 'Left"', Religion in Communist Lands, Vol.9, Nos.3-4, pp. 1 39- 146; and Michnik's 
own views in Adam Michnik, Letters From Prison and Other Essays. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1 985), pp. 160- 168; 3 1 7-333. 
33In personal conversation with the author in early 1 982. 
34Recommended biographies are:Christian Schmidt-Hauer, Gorbachev:The Path to 
Power. (London: Pan Books, 1 986); Gail Sheehy, "Gorbachev Red Star: The Shaping of the Man 
who Shook the World," Vanity Fair, February, 1990, pp. 1 10- 125, 1 80- 1 89; Dusko Doder and 
Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin� (New York: Viking Press, 1 990). 
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increasingly preferring dialogue to monologue." Criticism must be "based on absolute truth 
and scrupulous concern for justice . . .  we need glasnost as we need the air."35 
Gorbachev was not alone, that is essential to understanding the persistence of 
perestroika. Already in 1 984 Anatoly Gromyko (son of the Foreign Minister) had helped 
publish a major book on New Thinking in foreign policy.36 Gorbachev's own book of 
1 987  worked within the framework of the New Thinking. He had chosen to work within a .  
new general paradigm, as Alexander Yanov soon pointed out, 37 although it took most 
western leaders and scholars longer to recognize what was happening. The initial western 
reaction was to dismiss the theoretical parts of the book, they could not understand 
someone who had decided that "Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy 
only by different means . . .  has grown hopelessly out of date."38 A very recent book by 
Ernest Lefever illustrates the frozen mind set of Western critics.39 Other Western political 
scientists are now beginning to think through what it means to examine international 
relations from a Beyond War perspective.40 A major moment of change in the Soviet 
Union was the widespread public screening of the anti-Stalinist film, "Repentance," in 
early 1 987. "By deliberately eschewing facts, Abuladze [the producer] has precisely 
35Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World. (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1 987), pp. 2 1 ,  29, 77-78. 
36 Anatoly Gromyko and Vladimir Lomeiko. New Thinking in the Nuclear Age. (Moscow: 
1 984). See also Gromyko's contribution to Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman, eds. 
Breakthrough/Proryv: Emerging New Thinking. (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 1 988. 
Simultaneously published in Moscow by Progress Publishing). 
37Alexander Yanov, "Perestroika and its Critics," Slavic Review (Winter 1 988), pp. 7 16-725. 
38He considered even a "non-nuclear war .. .  comparable with a nuclear war in its destructive 
effect", hence proposed "basing international politics on moral and ethical norms that are common 
to all humankind . . .  " Gorbachev, p. 1 4 1 .  
39Ernest W. Lefever and Robert D. Vander Lugt, eds. Perestroika: How New is Gorbachev's 
New Thinking. (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, distributed by University Press 
of America, 1 989). 
40Walter Clemens, Jr. Can Russia Change? The USSR Confronts Global Interdependence. 
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1 990). 
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captured an era when truth meant less than nothing."'u The reviewer, Denise Youngblood, 
went on to observe that "every detail of setting and dialogue is absolutely impossible yet, in 
this context, absolutely right . . .  one learns nothing factual from it--and everything that 
matters about the Stalin period."42 To illustrate: "perhaps no one was executed for digging 
a tunnel from Bombay to London; perhaps . . .  ". Everyone remembered the title and its 
meaning--Repentance (Pokaiane). And everyone was left pondering the final line of the 
script "what use is a road that does not lead to a church?" 
Scholars are cu�rently filling books with summaries of the new glasnost literature and 
the scholarly debates, summarizing the new history now appearing in newspapers and 
journals.43 Step by step, the pillars of the system are being scrutinized and found wanting. 
No longer is it only the sins of Stalin, but also of the Party, and finally, in 1 990 even 
Lenin began to topple from his pedestal as infallible secular god. In doing so, these 
journalists were "typing out the fear,"44 both personally and corporately. 
THE DOCTRINE OF 'AS IF' FOR CIVIL SOCIETY 
In contrast to the 'as ir game described earlier, what developed between the time of 
Charta 77 and the papal visit to Poland in 1 979 was a self -conscious application of a true 
"as if" doctrine. The doctrine of As If was applied in both its "qualified" and its "absolute" 
forms. In its qualified application, the policy of As If would be to say to the persons in 
power, "Here are your proclaimed standards. Here are your own laws. Now stick to 
them."45 That was in essence the position of the Sovi�t dissent movement, beginning with 
41Denise Youngblood, film review of "Repentance" in American Historical Review. Vol. 94 No. 
4 (October 1 990), p. 1 1 34. 
42Ibid. 
43Useful volumes are Alec Nove. Glasnost' in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia. (Boston: 
Unwin Hyman, 1 990); R.W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution. (Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press, 1 989); Abraham Brumberg, ed. Chronicle of A Revolution: A 
Western-Soviet Inquiry into Perestroika. (New York: Pantheon, 1 990). 
44Time, April 1 0, 1 989, p. 1 24. 
45Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 989), p. 
106. 
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the Reform Baptist letters of appeal to the authorities in the early 1 960s, and for the rest 
of the democratic opposition. In their case, they might not have thought through the shaky 
logic of Newspeak but the courageous dissenters had found an inner liberation when they 
chose to challenge the authorities' violations of stated freedoms, whether freedom of 
religion, of speech, or of assembly. They discovered that the authorities could not always 
ignore their appeals, especially when open letters circulated in the West, or when the cases 
of prisoners' of conscience became internationally known. At the least, governmental 
prestige in the international community was at stake. For Vaclav Havel or Adam Michnik, 
to call on the authorities to act 'As If' they believed their own laws and constitutions, also 
included self- consciousness about what was involved for each partner. 
Michnik, for example, illustrates this in a passage from a letter to General Kiszczak 
upon learning that he would be offered an exit visa to spend Christmas on the Cote 
d'Azur, instead of facing a long sentence in prison. His letter began by listing four points 
of agreement, simply by spelling out the implications of the expulsion solution for dealing 
with Solidarity activists. By so ,doing, he said, the regime was admitting that it really did 
not have a case that would stand up in court, that the sentence had been decided in 
advance, that the indictment "will be so nonsensical that no one will be fooled", and that 
the intent is to remove embarrassing political adversaries rather than to implement justice. 
Then, using the subjunctive tense rather cleverly, Michnik went on to state that one 
"would have to be a fool" to "admit one's disregard for the law so openly"; that "one would 
have to be a swine" to offer a prisoner the Cote d'Azur "in exchange for his moral suicide"; 
and to expect that Michnik would have accepted was "to imagine that everyone is a police 
collaborator." In short, "I would like to suggest that the first thing you need to know, 
General, is what it is to have a human conscience." And the letter closes with an appeal, "I 
ask you to think again . . .  to think that you will be held responsible for your actions . . .  
and I wish you courage."46 Such qualified 'as if' proved to be disconcerting, at times even 
effective. Eventually the truth of the predictions, that one bears historic responsibility 
for one's actions in the system, became inescapable. In 1989 one witnessed Party leaders 
acknowledging that their claim to power was no longer legitimate. In its absolute 
application, on the other hand, the doctrine of As If "consists simply in teaching, writing, 
researching, painting, acting, publishing as far as possible and for as long as possible as if 
the state . . .  has withered away; as if you live in a free country."47 Although living in 
46 Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison, pp. 66-67. 
41 Ash, The Uses of Adversity, p. 1 16.  
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unfreedom, you "try to live as if you live in a free country . . .  though today your study 
[for example] is a prison ce11."48 
The focus on civil society, which is now attracting so much comment that some 
scholars have already begun to think of it as a worrisome new panacea, was based on the 
'social imagery' of "state versus society"--that was where it got its moral force. For the 
practitioners of "As Ir' there was a vision of a desirable society, according to the rules of 
which they already now wanted to live, and they wanted to get to a full realization of a 
civilized society by means that would indeed lead to it. The basic ideas included that 
"there should be forms of association, national, regional, local, professional, which would 
be voluntary, authentic, democratic and, first and last, not controlled by the Party or 
Party-State. People should be 'civil': that is, polite, tolerant, and, above all, non-violent. 
Civil and civilian. The idea of citizenship had to be taken seriously."49 
So the Solidarity leaders addressed themselves to independent public opinion. They 
advocated a policy of openness, of truthfulness, of trust (as deliberate policy) and a policy 
of autonomy of action. The later meant giving freedom of choice to each person. 
Jonathan Schell labelled it a "policy of militant decency."50 And the means to the 
expanding sphere of free civil society were to be nonviolent. Michnik had decided that 
violence was "unthinkable" as possible solution. Schell, who wrote when Michnik was back 
in prison and Solidarity was exercising its freedom underground, declared that nonviolence 
had turned out to be "especially well suited to fighting" totalitarianism, that "it is now a 
matter of record that by far the most effective resistance movement ever launched against 
a totalitarian regime was completely nonviolent."51 After the revolutions of 1 989, the non­
violent option seems eminently more realistic. 
48Ibid., p. I 06. 
49Ash, Magic Lantern, p. 147. Essentially the same elements are present when Abraham 
Brumberg, "The Turning Point," New York Review of Books, June 28, 1 990 quotes the platform 
statement of the Democratic Platform Group in the USSR, p. 56. 
50See his introduction to Michnik, Letters from Prison, pp. xxviii-xxix (earlier appearing in 
The New Yorker). 
51Ib"d 
. 
1 ., p. XXXVI. 
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Looking around the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1 990, there appears to be 
remarkable unanimity that there are at least four important dimensions to the task of 
emancipation from the totalitarian or totalist culture of the past:52 
1 .  To rediscover the national past, to reenter history. 
2. A revival of religion, either as personal quest or to recapture its contribution to the 
bearing of culture and values. 
3. A serious effort to reconstitute civil society. As Goldfarb described it, this involved 
the attempt "to expand a zone of independence from totalitarian definitions of control."53 
4. The rise of private enterprise. 
This did mean the need to return ownership of land and business to individuals, but much 
more, it represented the desire to restore the quality of personal identification with any 
social or economic enterprise, to remove the alienation from one's work-- one of those 
goals that Karl Marx had been so eloquent about, now stood on its head to achieve the 
same result. 
AFTER THE DELUGE - CAN 'AS IS' BE SUSTAINED? 
What happens to "as if'' and the project of reconstituting civil society and the withering 
away of the state after the Revolutions of '89? Now when 'as if' might falsely be thought 
of 'as is'? Or in more colorful terms: "Former censors, former border guards, former 
apparatchiki, former secret policemen: what is to be done with them? Or rather, what is to 
be done with Them--Oni--as the Communist power holders, great and small, were 
universally known?"54 Earlier the people had chanted "We are not like them." Six months 
later . . .  the answer had been given in advance by one of the major theoreticians of 'As 
If', Adam Michnik. In an article on "Angels and Maggots,"55 written while still in prison, 
he recounted Polish history in a way that each Polish hero turned out to have let the people 
down, had been a turncoat, or had been weakened or broken, had been a maggot rather 
52 Ash, The Uses of Adversity, p. 66. 
53Goldfarb, p.  22. 
54Garton Ash, "Eastern Europe: Apres le Deluge - Nous", The New York Review of Books, 
August 1 6, 1 990, p. 5 1 .  
55Michnik, Letters from Prison, pp. 1 69- 1 98.  
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than an angel. From this he drew the conclusion that a healthy civil society needed to 
avoid political moralism, needed to assume that each individual is capable of betrayal-­
each must be granted inclusion in the society in order to become more angelic. 
By mid- 1 990, Lech Walesa and others were in conflict with Michnik, concerned to root 
out the undesireables, unhappy with the working compromises in the mixed Polish 
parliament. Indeed across Eastern Europe it was common to talk about who did what to 
whom over the past forty years.56 In addition there quickly emerged the problem of the 
temptation by pow_er the urge once again to lead a double life, making a distinction 
between a public and private life and ethic. That issue will be the ongoing intellectual and 
moral problem. Is not the essence of parliamentary democracy "working in half-truth?", so 
one keen eyed Western observer.57 It might be helpful to recall that thinkers as diverse as 
Michnik and Gorbachev both envisioned a lengthy maturation process for a new political 
culture. 
THE CHURCHES' CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGE AND TRUTH TELLING 
Lutheran World Federation general secretary Gunnar Staalsett listed at least five 
significant contributions by the churches to the changes, all of them moral, for, as he put 
it, "religion . . .  did not function as the opium of the people, but rather as a source of hope 
and change."58 There was the moral message of the Slavic pope, John Paul II when he 
visited Poland in 1 979. On December 4, 1 989, the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev 
and John Paul II provided the occasion for granting legal status to the Uniate Church, and 
for Gorbachev to affirm the moral contribution of the churches to the perestroika of 
society. When the new GDR parliament met, it included 21 pastors or theologians. That 
was no surprise to knowledgeable observers since it had been in the churches that a 
56Ash, "Eastern Europe .. . ," p. 5 1  lists numerous issues, up to 10  dichotomies to show the 
complexity of the emerging alignments. For example, Walesa was talking about 'pluralism' versus 
the 'new monopoly' of his former advisers; Michnik says it is Europeans versus nationalists; other 
see the tension between underrepresented workers and overrepresented intelligentsia, or between 
city and country, or between 'the Ins' and 'the Outs'. But distinctions between 'left' and 'right' 
make the least sense. See also Adam Michnik, "The Two Faces of Europe," New York Review of 
I!QQk§,, July 19 ,  1 990. 
57 Ash, "Eastern Europe .. . ," p. 52. 
58Gunnar Staalsett, "Role of the Church in Eastern Europe-- Carrier of Hope?" Lutheran 
Theological Seminary Bulletin. Vol. 70, No. 3 ,  (Summer 1 990), p. 6. 
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platform for independent peace and ecology movements became possible. In Poland the 
church provided spiritual counsel to Solidarity leaders as well as ethical reflection and 
moral support. The churches across Eastern Europe could provide "an alternative language 
to the Marxist ideological phraseology,"59 a nonviolent language that could be freed from 
Newspeak. When negotiations became possible, the church, since it had regained general 
esteem for integrity, was called on to mediate the Round Table talks, or even to preside 
over local selection committees for new electoral candidates. The churches also provided 
some leadership (depending on the country or denomination) for exercises in public 
repentance. The Soviet response by Orthodox and Baptist leaders has been consistently 
cautious, but at least the acknowledgements for their past complicity in restraining church 
life that younger .leaders such as Archbishop Kirill, or the delegates to the AUCECB 
congress in February 1 990 gave, were not countered. Those dissident church spokespersons 
who had always called on church and state to be true to their words were now seeing the 
fruit of their efforts and witness, but often could not adapt to the leadership role now 
expected of them.60 Pastor Laszlo Tokes, soon elected Bishop of the Hungarian speaking 
Reformed Church in Romania, used his speeches to castigate the international church 
leadership--perhaps as a result the debate at the World Council of Churches ended in a less 
than forthright declaration of repentance for not having said enough about abuses and 
violations known to them, especially with reference to the Romanian situation. 
The Christian Peace Conference of Prague, compromised by the events of 1 968 but 
slowly regaining credibility and status chose a rather astonishing metanoia. The CPC 
Presidential board announced in December 1 989 that: 
It can now be seen that the hopes of a new ·social order through socialism have not 
been able to be fulfilled. Therefore, in the current situation of democratization 
and restructuring of socialism as it exists in practice, and the complete collapse of 
Stalinism, the CPC wants to stress that the task and implementation of its Christian 
witness for peace neither were nor will be linked with the socialist social order. 
Nevertheless, the ideals of social justice continue to be important for our 
movement . . . .  It is true that during the difficult period of the Cold War and in an 
atmosphere of strong ideological pressure, the CPC accepted some compromises, 
made mistakes, and in some cases gave way to pressure. We need to do penance for 
59Ibid., p .  7.  Cf. John Anderson, "Courtesy Towards God: Religion and Change in Eastern 
Europe", Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 1 8, No. 2 (Summer 1 990), pp. 1 00- 1 23 who argues 
for religion playing a part through the actuaL representatives of the churches, even if they were 
"frail ambassadors", religious ideas contributing the development of a human and ethical 
alternative, and third, by providing a place for dialogue. (p. 1 0  I ). 
601 have in mind particularly the Reform Baptist leaders. Father Gleb Yakunin, on the other 
hand, was active in attending international congresses on evangelism and was elected to the 
congress of Russian deputies. A recent sad and anxiety causing event was the brutal murder of 
Father Alexander Men, respected by intellectuals and simple people alike. 
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this, and to alter our methods of working and our terminology in the future . . . .  To 
this end a committee has been set up by the CPC Presidential Board to carry out a 
critical analysis of the history of the CPC . . .  the CPC will dare to make a new 
beginning.61 
Such tones are widely affirmed, but, as Jim Forest notes in a recent book on the Soviet 
Union,62 "Bishops as a general category are not renowned as penitents." Some of the issues 
calling for repentance have to do with those desperate moments of testing of the church, 
when its leaders decided that the way of discretion was the better way to save the church. 
"Can they repent of compromises," Forest asks, that "they deemed essential to protect the 
community from utter destruction? The health of a religious community-depends on each 
believer, not least those with great responsibilities, examining his or her own conscience 
and repenting."63 It is true that in many denominations there has been a house cleaning as 
less morally able leaders have been replaced by others. 
For some, an even more difficult task is the need for forgiveness, for reconciliation. 
When Leipzig pastor Ulrich Seidel offered Erich and Margot Honecker refuge in his home, 
there were many who found this incomprehensible. After all, Seidel's house had been 
vandalized, his church ransacked, his children refused an education, and he himself 
regularly persecuted. Thank God that there are similar acts of charity across Eastern 
Europe. Mostly, those who are now seeking reconciliation in Eastern Europe are doing so 
in the recognition that the wrongdoing must be named. "Reconciliation is not a scheme to 
silence those whose stories of the past need to be told completely. It is not about burying 
the truth in the disguise of forgiveness."64 
TRUTH FREES--TRUTH BURDENS 
As the remarkably insightful British scholar and writer Timothy Garton Ash, who had 
personally witnessed the revolutions in Budapest, Warsaw, Berlin and Prague reflected back 
on the year, he reminded his readers that "it is easy to forget that until almost the day 
61Christian Peace Conference Newsletter, December 1989. 
62Jim Forest. Religion in the New Russia: The Impact of Perestroika on the Varieties . of 
Religious Life in the Soviet Union. (New York: Crossroad, dist. by Harper & Row, 1 990), p. 208. 
63Jbid., pp. 208-9. 
64Staalsett, p. I 0. 
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before yesterday, almost everyone in East Germany and Czechoslovakia was leading a 
double life; systematically saying one thing in public and another in private."65 The most 
important liberation that had taken place was an inner liberation. The thinkers, actors, and 
church leaders had already learned how to think and act within the framework of the 
'post- totalitarian mind'. They had learned to refocus on society, on helping the state to 
wither away by no longer granting it ultimate power and authority, by no longer playing 
the 'as if' game according to the rules of the leaders, but according to the more inherent 'as 
if' of truth. 
The ordinary people, who in the end made the revolution happen, needed to discover 
that truth and commit themselves to it. In Poland it had happened in 1 979 during the 
papal visit when the state distanced itself from the people and the people decided they 
were the civitas that was hosting the pope. Others learned to think by the rules of 
nonviolence and truth during the peace movement, doing their own citizen diplomacy 
between East and West, until the leaders and diplomats joined them. But there were 
special moments of truth for the East Europeans in the autumn of 1 989. To understand 
them, Garton Ash remarked "you have first to make the imaginative effort to understand 
what it feels like to pay this daily toll of public hypocrisy."66 Now as they shouted 
together "wir sind ein Volk" or "swoboda" "these men and women were not merely healing 
divisions in their society, they were healing divisions in themselves."67 And Garton Ash 
reminded those, who might have missed it, that "everything that had to do with the word, 
with the press, with television, was of the first importance to these crowds. The semantic . 
occupation was as offensive as military occupation; cleaning up the linguistic environment 
as vital as cleaning up the physical environmerit."68 
In the Soviet Union as well, where the whole process was more gradual and controlled, 
the watershed moments were the moments of truth. Soviet philosopher Alexander Tsipko, 
who was also speaking with a new tongue, claimed that the breakthrough came in 1 987 
when the film "Repentance" was screened, when Soviet society and the intelligentsia 
65Garton Ash, Magic Lantern, p. 1 37. 
66Ibid. 
67Ibid. 
68Ibid., p. 1 38 .  
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"secured the right to search for the causes of the crises in the field of history."69 Then 
when "history has reentered our minds," Tsipko went on, "it has turned out that perestroika 
cannot do without repentance . . .  we depend on it for weeding out what still remains of 
Stalinism in our hearts and our life . . .  for cleansing our hearts of the vestiges of 
slavery."70 And yet, as we know, moments pass, new illusions and myths arise with 
renewed temptations to surrender truth to their service. Tsipko was now able to observe 
that "never before has humanity paid so high a price for its fondness for illusions . . .  
above all in the countries that are building socialism,"71 and in spite of the first steps of 
perestroika, new illusions were emerging, the Russian predilection for apocalypticism 
persisting. 72 Rather, the Soviet philosopher recommends a new "philosophy of limits of 
human ambition." That should include "more trust in truth . . .  above all, truth about our 
actual aims.'o73 Placing high value in the human personality, in the limits of human nature 
and in high respect for the law, "avoiding unnecessary sacrifices," he envisions essentially 
the same modest gradualist program as Timothy Garton Ash :was also noticing in Central 
Europe: a vision for a civil society where there is democracy, legality, and economics, 
without any qualifying adjectives added.74 
It seems that the ongoing tasks to sustain the revolution, to live well with 'as is', has 
much to do with humility, with the expectation of ongoing tension between persons and 
groups not yet fully consenting. to a common vision. To emphasize the more real power of 
truth, as we have done, might well be misinterpreted as an easy panacea, or as a simplistic 
69 Alexander Tsipko, Is Stal inism Really Dead? The Future of Perestroika as a Moral 
Revolution. (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1990), p. viii. 
70Ib"d . 1 ., p. lX. 
71Ibid., p. 1 1 . 
72Tsipko illustrates by quoting the astonishingly relevant comments from the Philosophical 
Letters of Peter Chaadaev ( 1 833): "In a certain way we are an exceptional people. We are one of 
the nations that don't seem to be part of the humanity and exist solely for the purpose of giving 
some sort of important lesson to the rest of the world. Of course, the lesson we are called upon to 
teach will not be in vain, but who can say when we will find ourselves among humanity and how 
many misfortunes shall we suffer before our predestined task is accomplished." Tsipko, op.cit., p. 
129. 
73Ibid. 
7474Ash, Magic Lantern, pp. 147- 1 5 1 .  That is, neither "socialist democracy" or 'Western 
capitalist democracy', but democracy, etc. 
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unreflective platitude to 'always tell the truth'. All the Eastern European voices who have 
finally been freed to speak truth, did so only after the burden of untruth had become to? 
intolerable, or they had discovered that only truth could slay the dragon. It involved 
learning from experience, from the group, if possible through solidarity, through respect 
for the person--yes even respect for the opponent and persecutor. And yet, there was also 
something more, "an additional supra-rational cause at work. Hegel's Weltgeist, said some. 
Agnes of Bohemia, said others. 'The whole world is moving from dictatorship to 
democracy', said a third", so Timothy Garton Ash. "But as for myself," he went on, "I'll 
stick with the angels."75 Earlier, when describing how the walls of Jericho (i.e. Berlin) had 
come tumbling down, Garton Ash had remarked "There are moments when you feel that 
somewhere an angel has opened his wings."76 That approaches the language of the 
Christian, who remembers that Jesus was truth incarnate, that the living in truth is a total 
dependency on God. Such Christians, and there are many of them across Eastern Europe 
who are now constantly asked to explain the reason for the hope that they have, recall the 
words of the Apostle Paul about being strong when one is weak. 77 For then the reliance is 
on God to do the impossible and unexpected. That kind of 'as if' living, or, to put it in 
more common Christian parlance--the already but not yet quality of God's kingdom--that · 
kind of living will help us "lean most heavily on humility in the face of truth. "78 
75Ibid., p. 1 28.  
76Ibid., p. 63. 
7711 Cor. 1 2:9- 1 0. 
7�sipko, p. 269. 
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